

CHANGES IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: TRANSFORMATION OF WORK SETTINGS AND HABITS AS POST-PANDEMIC EFFECTS

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Abstract: *The corona-virus pandemic has changed the business environment course, significantly and irreversibly. In this regard the purpose of this paper is to investigate and highlight one of the effects of the pandemic in a limited business area: work settings and habits within business organizations.*

As methodology this explorative paper is basically qualitative. However, both qualitative and quantitative data were collected, from pandemic start to-date (2020–2023). It is based on secondary research (literature survey, studies and statistical data) as well as primary research (observation completed with examples).

The results are selectively presented in two sections: (i) pandemic's transformative effects on productivity; and (ii) changes in work settings and habits as a result of productivity-linked, strategic decisions on business location. The main findings are formulated as four propositions meant at inviting to deeper studies. In addition, research limitations and further research paths conclude this piece of work.

Keywords: *Post-pandemic effects, Work settings and habits, Business location, Business organizations, Productivity, Strategic decisions, Artificial intelligence (AI)*

INTRODUCTION: CORONA-VIRUS PANDEMIC

In 2019 the COVID-19 pandemic broke up and quickly spread globally, impacting irreversibly our lives [1]; the pandemic provoked victims and restrictions that have damaged the economic growth across multiple sectors of activity, shutdown of many firms, disruptions in the supply chain, as well as changes in consumer preferences. Krause and Trappe [2] (p. viii) have shown that “After the pandemic, *nothing will be as it was*. A previously unknown illness has swept across Europe like a storm, and wherever it has raged, *entire social systems have been utterly changed*.”

As early as March 2020, *Bloomberg Businessweek* [3] has announced gloomy perspectives for the US workforce, by income and industry. Coyle, Dreesbeimdiek and Manley [4] studying the productivity in the UK healthcare during corona-virus pandemic argued that *productivity growth* is “an economy-wide phenomenon” and the “healthcare currently suffers from additional pressures”.

Studies conducted to identify expectations among population [5] (p. 63) have shown that: “In late 2020, with the approval of covid-19 vaccines, and into 2021, as the jobs worked their magic, techno-optimism began to spread, if people could develop life-saving inoculations in months, why couldn't the world move out of its low-growth, low-productivity slumber? *Firms could embrace digitization as never before*; the shift to working from home could allow people, free of office gossip and draining commutes, *to work more effectively*” and “governments promised to spend big on science; companies outlined juicy R&D plans”.

The Economist [6] (p. 11) reported that in “the early days of covid-19, the tech industry was consumed by a sense of euphoria.” While billions of people locked down at home, working online, “many hoped that the new normal would *spark a huge productivity boom as firms digitized and workers spent less time commuting*. The excitement was most evident in stock markets, where any firm related to this trend saw its share price surge. The value of an equally weighted portfolio of five pandemic darlings [...] increased by 320% from the start of the pandemic to its peak in August 2021”. Then, the euphoria has ended – so that Zoom was trading at below pre-pandemic prices.” [6] The results were contrasting, as the cloud service providers (Google, Microsoft), cyber-security firms, and digital payment services have reported excellent results [6] (p. 12).

A study conducted by *The Economist* reported in January 2023 [7] (p.59) several post-covid problems – among them the health-care collapse: since the monthly deaths across Europe are currently about 10% higher than expected, it seems that “the immediate problems facing health-care systems are not caused by a lack of cash [...] perhaps the *real problem is not staff numbers, but how efficiently they are working*”. [all italicized phrases are by the author]

It is beyond the purpose of this paper to deal with all effects of this terrible challenge that has challenged our lives and entire society. The author's focus is on specific type of post-pandemic business effects as *productivity-related changes in work setting and habits* of the business community at organization level.

METHOD: OBSERVING MAJOR POST-PANDEMIC BUSINESS EFFECTS

Given the scope of work (transformation of work settings and habits, at organizational level, as productivity-linked post-pandemic effects), this paper is essentially qualitative – using qualitative methods (comparison, analysis and synthesis) – in order to reach the main objective: to identify the post-pandemic changes in work settings and habits.

Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected from pandemic start to-date (2020–2023), predominantly based on secondary research (literature survey, studies and statistical data published by reliable and professional sources) as well as primary research (observation completed with examples from international environment). The criteria for selecting the examples are fairly subjective (related to the author's area of interest), yet based on objective data.

The data collected were processed and analyzed in the context of major post-pandemic effects, as strategic decisions on business location [8], in the framework of an original conceptual model.

The results are selectively and systematically presented in two relevant sections: (i) pandemic's transformative effects on productivity; and (ii) changes in work settings and habits as result of strategic decisions on business location. The findings (including four concluding propositions) are discussed in the post-pandemic context.

RESULTS

Pandemic's transformative effect on productivity

Studies conducted on productivity [4,7] are not in agreement. In other words, the productivity figures do not help much to make predictions – as they are volatile, sometimes contradictory, and, in addition, discontinuous. *The Economist* believes volatility as coronavirus-linked: “official statistics are usually volatile because of lockdown disruptions” [5] (p. 63). Considering the disruptions caused by the corona-virus restrictions, a survey of economists in America and Europe agreed on uncertainty about the long-term predictions on productivity [5] (pp. 63-64).

Despite initial optimism [5,6] generated by the production and availability of corona-virus vaccine, unexpectedly, *during pandemic the productivity decreased* [5]: “In the second quarter of 2022 American GDP appeared to fall by 0.1%, even as the number of Americans on the payrolls rose by 1.3m. Britain's GDP fell by the same amount, while employment rose by 150,000. Both *economies are thus producing less with more people working*. Similar surprise is shared by Gordon and Sayed [9] who note that “today's weak productivity is the flipside of the strong growth in 2020 [... looking like] firms fired their weakest workers, boosting productivity [and now] they are rehiring them, dragging it back down”.

The Economist's analysis published in 2022 [5] (pp. 63-64) provides documented reasons for these unexpected results:

- *Investments were not necessarily directed to lifting productivity*; in other words “short-term crisis management has taken precedence over long-term innovation”. In spite of the fact that “in America R&D spending remains high, [The Economist's] calculation for 31 countries suggests that overall rich-world spending on ‘intellectual property products’ is running at about \$3trn a year – below its pre-pandemic trend. [...] American imports of robots, in real terms, are not higher than shortly before the pandemic.”
- *The pandemic has introduced inefficiencies itself* – i.e. more sick days taken by workers, more spending on extra cleaning and sanitization, etc.

Gordon and Sayed [9] also argued that there is “no room for a pandemic-era revival in productivity growth as has been widely suggested”.

Work productivity versus work intensity

Linked to the *work productivity* is also the *work intensity*, both displaying tendency to decline as result of corona-virus pandemic [10] (p.81): “Some think that a trend among younger people to scale back their working intensity, known as ‘quiet quitting’, may have caused the labour market tighten. Recent research by scholars at Washington University in St Louis reveals a clear reduction in hours worked by those in jobs. But most quiet quitters are high-earning workers, whereas the biggest labour shortages have been in basic service jobs. That points to another factor: illness. In 2022 an average 1.6m Americans missed at least one week of work per month to recuperate – whether from covid, flu or something else – up from 1m before covid. Little by little, Americans will get back to better health. Unfortunately for employers, baby-boomers are unlikely to come out of retirement.”

Accelerated use of robots – following to workers' shortage

In early 2020 when the corona-virus pandemic started, economists predicted high unemployment to follow, because it looked quite normal that robots will replace humans; or, as *The Economist* [11] noted, “people get sick; robots do not”. Two years later, in 2022: “It is hard to find much evidence of job-killing automation. Rather than workers complaining about a shortage of jobs, bosses complain about a shortage of workers.” *The Economist* conducted a finer analysis of the jobs, based on a methodology developed by the *Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis*, explaining that ‘routine’ jobs

(including repetitive movements, which are more easily replaceable by robots – i.e., automatization) as opposed to ‘nonroutine’ jobs. [...] As during pandemic the declining rate has slowed, the researchers explain this decline: “perhaps the routine roles which remain are particularly difficult to automate” [11] (p. 51).

Three major strategy-linked post-pandemic changes were identified, as results of the pressure exercised by the coronavirus threat (Figure 1):

- Business networking as result of survival strategies (cooperation-based);
- Technology acceleration as result of competitive strategies (turning a threat into an opportunity); mainly digital technology acceleration (in particular AI acceleration) – i.e. digitalization as strategy [8];
- *Changes in work settings and habits* (mainly remote working) as location-linked strategic decisions, facilitated by ICT (information and communication technology), specifically AI acceleration.

This piece of work is focused on the third result. Nowadays, digitalization is so dominant that it is difficult to imagine a single day without it. Large language models (LLMs), ChatGPT (launched in November 2022) and the applications based on artificial intelligence (AI) – even remote work at its dimension of today – were not in sight before pandemic.




Figure 1: Corona-virus post-pandemic business effects (Author’s simplified scheme).

Changes in work settings and work habits

“When Covid-19 struck, many of us began to live our work and social lives in the online realm. We worked from home rather than commuting to the office, ordered our groceries online instead of going to the supermarket, got food delivered instead of eating in restaurants, and caught up with friends on Zoom rather than over a coffee in town. Schools, churches and even courts moved online. Since the pandemic died down, many people have continued to spend

much more time in the virtual world than before coronavirus. This shift seems to be permanent.” [12] (p. 229)
What a comprehensive yet synthetic diagnosis for the post-pandemic sequels from a professor of global health!

During pandemic work settings have changed: remote work

In September 2022, most of the world is returning to pre-pandemic activity levels, but some changes may persist; or, in other words, the economic activity is returning to pre-pandemic levels, but *not in the same places* because *working from home* becomes common: “a third of paid full days in America are now done from home” [13]. Working from home is just “great for work-life balance but predictions that it would also help people work more efficiently, which pre-pandemic studies had suggested, are as yet unfulfilled” [5]. According to *The Economist* [14] (p. 57): “bosses now believe that working from home, once seen as a productivity-booster, gives too many people the excuse to slack-off”; therefore, generative AI itself could act “as a drain of productivity” and could “make some industries vastly more productive”. This opinion is shared by a report published by *Financial Times* [15] and Jacobs [16] writes that “covid-19 dismantled outdated practices but what replaces them remains contested”.

Bloom, Han and Liang [17,18] as well as Brynjolfsson et al. [19] have conducted documented research on “hybrid working from home” (2022) and “working remotely” (2023) respectively – *hybrid work* becoming the term for the mixed working system in-out office (not necessarily home-based office). Under this conclusion, *The Economist* [20] published a synthesis of expert opinions on hybrid work: (i) How quickly people would get back to the office? (ii) How strictly to enforce attendance on days when teams are meant to be in the office?

Hybrid work is here to stay!

- How quickly people would get back to the office?

In 2022 Bloom [17] has shown that only 15% of Americans were working from home: “roughly 55% of US workers are fully in person, 30% are in hybrid arrangements, and the rest are fully remote” – explaining that “the disease has ushered in a profound change in white-collar working patterns” and “the office is not dead but many professionals have settled into a hybrid arrangement of some office days and some remote days”. His conclusion was that “*hybrid working has much to recommend it*: flexibility for employees, periods of concentration at home, bursts of co-operation in the office”. An experiment conducted for nine weeks in Bangladesh in the summer of 2020 by Choudhury et al. [21] suggests that hybrid work (between 23% and 40% of their time spent in the office) is more effective (measured as more emails sent, a higher number of email recipients, and increased novelty of work products). In different work environment, Emmanuel, Harrington and Pallais [22] show that software engineers (mostly young and female ones) receive more online feedback when the team members sit next to each other, while other scholars [17,18] argue that new employees better immerse in the company culture if they spend more time in the office. The opposite opinion is emphasized by *The Economist* [20] (p. 59) surveying hybrid workers in London: “the youngest cohort was more likely than older ones to think that it was easier to put themselves forward for important tasks when working remotely”.

There is an obvious conclusion: *despite shared advantages and disadvantages among different categories of workers, and also between employers and employees, hybrid work continues as a significant proportion*. This proportion varies from industry to industry and from region to region, and it will continue to oscillate until it will reach a dynamic equilibrium in-out office, *never to return to the pre-pandemic level*.

- How strictly to enforce attendance on days when teams are meant to be in the office?

The Economist [20] observes that “before the pandemic, having a single colleague in a different building was associated with less feedback”. Its extreme extension makes also sense: the research conducted by Emmanuel et al. (2022) has shown that moving everything online is harmful for the employer [22]. On the other hand, leaving the employees freely to choose their preferred days of remote work is not convenient for the employers (as office resources are not used efficiently). A lesson from the first full year of hybrid work is that *flexibility does not mean a free-for-all* – because “the elastic week needs some fairly rigid scaffolding” [20] (p. 59).

The collar colour does matter! The impact of the generative artificial intelligence (AI) on labour market

Brynjolfsson, Li and Raymond [23] have studied a generative AI-based conversational assistant that used data from 5,179 customer support agents and concluded that *AI tools have positive effects overall* (productivity included), but it is different from individual to individual, *depending on workers’ skills and experience*: “Access to the tool increases productivity, as measured by issues resolved per hour, by 14 percent on average, with the greatest impact on novice and low skilled workers, and *minimal impact on experienced and highly skilled workers*” – providing “suggestive evidence that the AI model disseminates the potentially tacit knowledge of more able workers and helps newer workers move down the experience curve” and “AI assistance improves customer sentiment, reduces requests for managerial intervention, and improves employee retention”.

The Economist studied changes produced among ‘white-collar staff’ across industries and territories as far as work habits – all being a valuable source of *in vivo* lesson learning. In contrast to the replaceable white-collar jobs, the blue-collar work – such as construction and farming, which accounts for about 20% of rich world – ultimately still has to do the physical work”; and large language models (LLMs) are “of little use to someone picking asparagus” GDP [24] (p. 57). The same situation is met in sectors where the human side is part of the service (e.g., hospitality, medical care).

A particular colour of collar is worn by managers; probably it is light-blue (i.e. in-between white and blue). As far as managerial job and it is going to be impacted by the AI development is another issue. The digital economy expert and

academic Erik Brynjolfsson [25] has an unforgettable answer:

AI won't replace managers, but managers who use AI will replace those who don't.

Nevertheless, regardless the colour of collars, the impact the developing AI technologies may have on the workforce has an influence on the value of firms – as recent studies demonstrate [26]. Although a quantitative answer is provided, which is “received by investors as good news for more exposed firms”, the authors report a “wide variation across and within industries, consistent with the substantive disruptive potential of Generative AI technologies”.

Related to labour market and popular concern for jobs, *The Economist's* study [14] (p. 56) highlights what Tyna Eloundou of Open AI has declared: “around 80% of the US workforce could have at least 10% of their work tasks affected by the introduction of LLMs”. This is supported by the research on the economic impact of generative AI (including language modelling and image generation) conducted by Felten, Raj and Seamans between 2018 and 2023 [27,28] using “a recently developed methodology to systematically assess which occupations are most exposed to advances in AI language modeling and image generation capabilities.” They found that “highly-educated, highly-paid, white-collar occupations may be most exposed”; however they suggest that “government can play an important role in helping people adapt to how generative AI changes work” (*Ibidem*). Baily, Brynjolfsson and Korinek [29] expect that “millions of knowledge workers, ranging from doctors and lawyers to managers and salespeople to experience similar ground-breaking shifts in their [AI-powered] productivity within a few years, if not sooner”.

Three illustrative examples for common AI-induced changes in work settings and habits are selected as more relevant.

Example 1: White collars – The case of law firms

FT Innovative Lawyers Asia-Pacific 2023 is a yearly ranking, report and awards scheme for lawyers based in the Asia-Pacific region, produced by the *Financial Times* and its research partner, *RSGI* (www.ft.com/innovative-lawyers). As a result of her survey conducted during the *FT Innovative Lawyers Asia-Pacific 2023*, Rozen [30] identified innovative *legal practices* (i.e. legal services providers) that acted quickly to adapt to the use of generative AI in their effort to better serve their clients. As she said: “generative artificial intelligence is forcing a rethink of even the latest legal technology” [30] (p. 12). A set of short examples are provided below.

- **Allen & Overy** has released a generative AI tool to its 3,500 lawyers, including those in Asia-Pacific [30] (p. 12); it also has developed *SubscribeMatrix*, a tool that automates and improves the accurate collation and digitised data for a banking client, increasing the speed and accuracy of the subscription process [31] (p. 28).

- **Inkling Legal Design** is a young (5-year-old) legal service firm that has deployed ‘psychographic’ techniques for analyzing and improving the design of legal documents, ensuring that transaction risks and compliance obligations are better understood by their clients [31] (p. 28).

The firm advised other legal firms on adopting generative AI since ChatGPT became available – yet “lawyers often express concern about sharing their knowledge to help customise AI tools [...] and they fret about making expertise more available to a wider audience at a lower cost by ‘scaling their intellect’ – therefore they often want to limit access to their own teams” [30] (p. 12).

- **Lander & Rogers**. Despite their initial reluctance (“no one would have thought that [legal] processes this complex could be automated”), the opinion of the lawyers within **Lander & Rogers** has changed “in late 2022, when generative AI caught widespread attention” [30] (p. 12). The company has helped its client’s in-house team roll out adoption of Australian-specific contract automation software across its six business units [31] (p. 28).

Notably, these firms were nominated for the *Smart Delivery* award during *FT Innovative Lawyers Asia-Pacific 2023*: Lander & Rogers as ‘standout’, Inkling Legal Design and Allen & Overy as ‘commended’ [31] (p. 28). In addition, Allen & Overy (UK-based) and Lander & Rogers (Australia-based) were ranked in the first half of the *FT law firm index – Asia-Pacific 2023*, which listed the top 30 participating law firms based on submissions made to the 2023 report and index [32] (p. 4).

Example 2: Time to learn fast! Case of the online-education group Chegg

In education and publishing industry, “teachers and editors will need to check that everything they read has not been composed by an AI. OpenAI has released a program that allows you to do this. It is thus providing the world a solution to a problem that its technology has created” [14] (p. 57).

In his professional career in a number of companies, Dan Rosensweig has served (among other positions) as COO at Yahoo! between 2002 and 2006, and in 2010 has joined Chegg as president and CEO. In this capacity he has overseen the company’s IPO in 2013, many acquisitions and expansion of the company – so that Chegg has developed from textbook rental to a student digital service provider: the online-education group Chegg. As Waters [33] (p. 6) shows, Chegg was “the first company to report a hit to its business from generative artificial intelligence, as some students turned to smart chatbots for answers rather than subscribe for its services”. Experienced “from previous big tech shifts”, Rosensweig “was quick to claim that incumbents such as Chegg stand to be big winners from transformative new technologies like this – provided they act quickly enough to co-opt them for their own use”. And the story goes on like this: “Wall Street decided that this sounded as wishful thinking and wiped nearly 50 per cent from Chegg’s stock price in a day. [...] Despite saying this week that AI had only an impact on its business ‘at the margin’, Chegg is deemed by Wall Street to be worth a third of what it was when ChatGPT was launched late last year. Even companies that react quickly to the threat are unlikely to get credit until the competitive dynamics of the new market are better known.” [*Ibidem*] Rosensweig’s declaration was quick and cool: “this is not a sky-is-falling thing, it’s a technological

shift”. Yet, the CEO’s action was also quick: the Chegg’s strategy was adjusted accordingly – as Rosensweig negotiated the Chegg’s partnership with OpenAI, aiming to integrate AI into its own services. *Other companies are taking now a similar course, and probably many others will as well.*

Example 3: Humans replaced by AI tools and intelligent robots – The case of banks and AI start-ups

In January 2023 Walker and Martin [34] have shown that: “Banks are gearing up for the *biggest round of job cuts* since the global financial crisis, as executives come under pressure to slash costs following a collapse in investment banking revenues. The lay-offs – which are expected to be in the *tens of thousands* across the sector – reverse the mass hirings banks made over the past few years and the *reluctance to fire staff during the Covid-19 pandemic.*” Large banks (Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Bank of New York Mellon) have begun to cut more than 15,000 jobs by the end of 2022 and, according to the same source, “industry watchers expect others to follow suit, emboldened by the headline-grabbing plans already announced”. Credit Suisse – the scandal-plagued Swiss bank – announced “by far the biggest cuts”: in October 2022 the bank said “it would be eliminating 9,000 roles from its 52,000 workforce over the next three years” (*Ibidem*).

The Economist [35] signals “the austere spirit” among a category startups “that is unaffected by investors’ newfound stinginess: those which develop all the sought-after AI tools” (Table 1).

Table 1: Comparing AI startups with older IT startups. Adapted after [35].

Startup company	Founders	Year founded	Amount raised [million USD]	Number of employees
Adept AI (AI startup)	Former employees of DeepMind (Alphabet’s AI lab)	2022	415	37
Anthropic (AI systems)	Defectors from OpenAI (creators of ChatGPT)	2021	1,200	160
Databricks (Database maker)	Original creators of Apache Spark™	2013	883	1,700
Klarna (Payment company)	Swedish co-founders	2005	1,200	2,700

There are two elements to notice: (i) it is quite normal that older companies – when successful – to have more employees; (ii) however, despite being compared at about same stage of development and similar amount secured, AI startups run the business with significantly less employees (one tenth). It looks like *it is AI that counts!*

Following to these data and examples, it is realistic to formulate that:

- P1** *During corona-virus pandemic work settings have changed (including remote work) – assumed to be temporary and reversible.*
- P2** *After pandemic, changes in work settings and habits remain significant, becoming quasi-permanent and stable – as hybrid work, highly dependent on and influenced by digital technology.*
- P3** *AI dramatically influenced the labour market – in terms of productivity and jobs (both structure and number); results largely vary by workers’ experience and qualification/skills, also across industries and regions.*
- P4** *Strategic decisions about business location were disrupted by pandemic, and after pandemic decisions criteria have changed (considering the experience of newer work settings and habits).*

Note that work setting and habits changed under corona-virus pandemic both directly (social distance restrictions) and mainly indirectly – inter-mediated by the digital acceleration and novel artificial intelligence, as depicted in Figure 1.

DISCUSSION

The main results were presented in the context of corona-virus pandemic, restricted as scope of work, leaving aside the devastating medical and health issues, as well as other post-pandemic which were not discussed: the disruption of the supply chains [36] was a serious global issue, particularly the semiconductors supply chain sourced from Taiwan [37]. Corona-virus pandemic accelerated the process of highlighting the business champions (risk-takers entrepreneurial characters), who have turned the pandemic threat into opportunity to invest in digital technology at a higher pace – contributing to accelerated digitalization [38]. AI emergence is critical to influence the labour market – in terms of productivity and jobs (both structure and number). Overall, the AI impact on productivity is positive but the results largely vary by workers’ experience and qualification/skills, also across industries and regions. Hence – besides the need for further case-by-case analysis – there are critical managerial implications.

Eisfeld, Schubert and Zhang [26] demonstrated that impact the developing AI technologies may have on the workforce has an influence on the value of firms. The stock market reacted to the emergence of AI or AI-induced companies (as

Californian company Nvidia – now the fifth most valuable listed corporate entity in America) and investors are working out how they might be able to take advantage by buying AI-exposed firms [39].

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

“Although such profound changes might seem unachievable ... we should take inspiration from the fact that, throughout history, *pandemics have driven momentous political and economic transformations*. They shine a light on corrupt and incompetent leaders ..., and encourage people to question the status quo.” Kennedy [12] (pp. 232–233). This piece of work has identified and investigated three international case-examples (based on original scheme), which were selected by fairly subjective criteria (related to the author’s area of interest), yet based on objective data. Essentially qualitative, any quantitative extension is a further research path to follow. So are the deeper studies on each of the effects discussed and propositions (numbered P1-to-P4) formulated in an original manner, as well as investigation of any of the intertwined issues already mentioned.

A more sophisticated approach might be used to assess the reaction time (delay or time lag) – which may prove useful for policymakers (in the health sector in particular). French academician Cahen mentions the study of the weak signals (signaux faibles) as a means for early warning of highly improbable and impactful future events like pandemic-provoked crises [40]: “Le commerce, comme toute l’économie, entre dans un temps nouveau en plein d’interrogations. *La Covid a accéléré les signaux faibles des vingt dernières années*. La prospective s’annonce difficile. Suivent trois axes de réflexion pour ces prochaines années sur le commerce, sur Internet, et enfin sur le nouveau consommateur.”

Open end: even further research questions

Discussing the future of artificial intelligence (AI), *The Economist* [41] (p. 65) states that “large, creative AI models [of the future] will transform how people live and work”. Indeed. As future technologies develop, the question is how fast, how far, and how deep will the generative AI large language models (LLMs) go? Today the results are promising, despite unwelcome errors – some of them funny: as the story goes, interrogated if it is capable of *feeling love*, ChatGPT (the chatbot made available to the public by *OpenAI*) answered: “Yes! I love ice cream!”

Will the next AI-based businesses be founded by ice cream lovers?

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